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Abstract
Ecologists and economists try to explain collective behavior in terms of competi-
tive systems of selfish individuals with the ability to learn from the past. Statistical
physicists have been investigating models which might contribute to the understand-
ing of the underlying mechanisms of these systems. During the last three years one
intuitive model, commonly referred to as the Minority Game, has attracted broad
attention. Powerful yet simple, the minority game has produced encouraging results
which can explain the temporal behaviour of competitive systems. Here we switch
the interest to phenomena due to a distribution of the individuals in space. For
analyzing these effects we modify the Minority Game and the Local Minority Game
is introduced. We study the system both numerically and analytically, using the
customary techniques already developped for the ordinary Minority Game.
PACS: 02.50.Le; 05.40.+j; 64.60.Cn
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In recent years statistical physicists have become increasingly interested in
phenomena of collective behaviour related to populations of interacting indi-
viduals, typical of economic and biological systems. The aim is to find models
that are easy to handle, but still describe the self organization of populations
as accurately as possible. Such models can be found by applying the tools of
game theory, that analyze the mechanisms of individuals reasoning in groups.
Inspired by W. B. Arthur’s Farol Bar Problem [1], D. Challet and Y.-C. Zhang
proposed the minority game (MG) [2]: it is a simple, but rich model describ-
ing a population of selfish individuals fighting for a common resource, as in
the stock market, on roads or at waterholes. At a given time, each individual
chooses between two opposing actions, that can be simplified as a = ±1. In
the above examples, these options might be to buy or to sell, to take the high-
way or the backroad or to go to waterhole A or B. Since overall resources are
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limited the aim of each individual is to make the choice shared by the minority
of the population. Each individual does not know what the others will choose;
consequently, there is in general no best solution to the problem [3] and the
individuals take their decisions using strategies, that is rules for choosing in
each situation, based on the individual’s own beliefs. The only information on
which an individual can base his decisions is the history µ of the game, that is
the sequence of the last M winning choices, e.g. +1,+1,−1 for M = 3, where
M denotes the length of his memory. A strategy s then defines which action to
take in every situation, and hence consists in a sequence of +1s and −1s, one
for each possible history µ. Since there are two possible choices, the number of
histories is 2M , which leads to a total number of 22
M
possible strategies, {Si}.
In the original formulation of the MG, each individual was assumed to possess
two strategies. These strategies are chosen by each player randomly from {Si},
and never changed during the game. In general the assigned strategies differ
from individual to individual: this reflects their different beliefs. Individuals
do not choose a specific action, but rather a strategy that determines what
action to take. At every turn of the game the strategies that would have won
get a reward, and at the next turn the players choose the strategy with the
highest score (this rule can be strict, or probabilistic: the strategy with the
highest score has the greatest probability to be chosen). By this mechanism
(reinforcement learning), players are able to learn whether they have a better
strategy to use, and the system as a whole shows an extremely rich behavior.
The original MG has been studied extensively through numerical simulations,
with the introduction of many different features [4], and then analytically
solved through a clever mapping onto a spin glass-like model [5]. The exact
solution shows that the MG undergoes a phase transition between a sym-
metric phase, in which all the individuals perform as if they were just acting
randomly, and an asymmetric phase where some individuals always play the
same strategy which turns out to be constantly the winning one. In this phase
the system is the most efficient, in the sense that on the average there is always
the possible maximum number of winners. Moreover, it has been shown that
in the stationary state the histories may be replaced by random sequences
without sensibly changing the properties of the game [6], suggesting that all
the histories occur with almost the same probability (the system is almost
ergodic in the history space). So far, the system has been considered as a
population of individuals, each one interacting with all the others. In reality
however an individual is often in contact with only a small part of the whole
population. He has no information about how the members of his group in-
teract with members of other groups, and he tries to perform optimally in his
immediate surroundings.
In order to add this spatial aspect to the MG, we define a local MG (LMG)
(a different local version of the MG has been introduced in [7]). Here, every
individual still has the possibility to choose one of his strategies (for simplifica-
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tion, a number of S = 2 strategies is assigned to each individual) that dictates
his next action. As in the global game, each individual always tries to be in
the minority group by identifying the optimal strategy. The difference with
respect to the MG lies in the definition of the region in which an individual
is acting. In the MG every individual was interacting with all the others; in
the LMG, instead, for each individual a small region is assigned, in which he
attempts to be in the minority. To simplify, individuals occupy the sites of a
1d lattice, each one interacting with his two nearest neighbours. A region thus
contains l = 3 individuals. Each individual i observes a different outcome Ai of
the game than do the others and reconstructs a different history µi. His next
action ai depends then on his own subjective local history µi. The outcome
Ai(t) at time t is defined as being the difference of the number of individuals
that chose a = +1 and the number of those that chose a = −1. The sign of
Ai(t) then corresponds to the losing choice. Individual i knows the outcome
in region i at time t, given by Ai(t) =
∑
j∈Λi a
µj
j (t) where Λi denotes the set
of individuals seen by player i. The reward for the players in the minority is
then proportional to Ai (the fewer they are, the higher the reward). The gain
(or loss) individual i makes at time t can thus be defined as
ui(t) = −aµi(t)i,si (t)Ai(t), (1)
where si denotes the strategy he uses at time t, and his total profit up to t
is Ui(t) = Ui(t − 1) + ui(t). The two strategies of individual i are indicated
with si,1 =↑ and si,2 =↓. For both his strategies individual i knows the gain he
would have made, if he had used that strategy. In accordance with its score,
a strategy si is then chosen by individual i with probability
pii,si(t) =
eβUi,si (t)
eβUi,↑(t) + eβUi,↓(t)
, (2)
where β plays the role of an inverse temperature β = 1/T . For a system of N
individuals, mean values can be written as
〈Aµ〉 =
N∑
i=1
∑
si=↑,↓
pii,sia
µi
i,si
. (3)
The convention of writing aµii = ω
µi
i +siξ
µi
i , as it was introduced in the MG [5],
leads to
ωµii =
aµii,↑ + a
µi
i,↓
2
and ξµii =
aµii,↑ − aµii,↓
2
. (4)
Defining Ωµi =
∑
j∈Λi ω
µj
j leads to the local outcome A
µi = Ωµt +
∑
j∈Λi ξ
µj
j sj .
3
The evolution of the mean value becomes
mi(t) = 〈si〉 = pii,↑ − pii,↓ = tanh β [Ui,↑(t)− Ui,↓(t)] , (5)
where for calculation we used ↑= +1 and ↓= −1. In analogy to the MG [5] the
mean value is taken over all possible histories µi for each individual. Taking the
time derivative of (5), and using (2), after some simple algebra the dynamics
become
dmi
dt
= −2β
[
1−m2i
] dH
dmi
, (6)
where
H = 2
N∑
i=1
Ωµii ξ
µi
i mi +
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Λi
ξµii ξ
µj
j mimj . (7)
O denotes the mean value of a quantity O over all possible histories of each
region. A spin-glass hamiltonian H =
∑
i himi +
∑
i
∑
j∈Λi Ji,jmimj is thus
found for spins with values mi ∈ [−1,+1] in a random field hi = Ωµii ξµii
and with random interactions Ji,j = ξ
µi
i ξ
µj
j . The system minimizes H for
distributions {Ji,j}, which are given by the initial distribution of strategies
among the individuals.
In the intuitive example of two anticorrelated strategies per individual, the
action performed by strategy ↑ of individual i is the opposite of the action
performed by his strategy ↓ for every history, i.e. aµii,↑ = −aµii,↓. As a result,
ωµii = 0 ∀ i, µi and thus the field hi vanishes. In the simple case of M = 1
the system behaves like an antiferromagnet. This is straightforward, since the
best configurations are individuals taking alternative actions (↑↓↑↓↑ etc.). For
M = 1, chosing a strategy is equivalent to choosing an action. For periodic
boundary conditions and an even number N of individuals, everyone wins.
Analytically this can be understood by calculating Ji,j = ξ
µi
i ξ
µj
j . On the one
hand ξµii ξ
µj
j = 1 ∀ i, j for which aµii,↑ = aµjj,↑ and on the other hand ξµii ξµjj =
−1 ∀ i, j for which aµii,↑ = aµjj,↓, independent of the history. This corresponds to
an antiferromagnetic spin system at T = 0. The individuals build clusters in
which everyone is frozen to one of his strategies and therefore constantly wins.
Between two incompatible clusters there is a boundary on which individuals
are frustrated. Unlike the MG where the maximum number of winners is
(N − 1)/2, the LMG shows configurations where every individual can win,
depending on the nature of the regions. For increasingM the number of frozen
individuals decreases until the system reaches the state of random individuals,
a behavior which is confirmed by simulations. This example shows clearly how
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the LMG differs from the MG. In the MG, the case of two anticorrelated
strategies is inefficient, which can be clearly understood since it corresponds
to an antiferromagnet in infinite dimensions, while in the LMG it can lead to
situations where everyone wins.
The LMG is generalized to two dimensions by placing the individuals on a
square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. Now each individual has four
nearest neighbours and the regions are chosen to consist of l = 5 individuals.
Strategies are still taken as anticorrelated, thus implying a vanishing random
field {hi}. Analogous to the one-dimensional case, a mapping on a spin system
can be performed, which leads to the partition function
Z[{Ji,j}] =
+1∫
−1
∏
i
dmie
−βH[{Ji,j ,mi,mj}]. (8)
In order to calculate the free energy, the average over the distribution of the
interactions {Ji,j} needs to be taken. Still we do not know whether we should
take the average of the partition function itself (8) or of the free energy. The
choice depends on whether in (7) the interactions are annealed or quenched
random variables. Numerical simulations determine the distributions P (Ji,j)
to be nearly gaussian at high temperatures, where the system is disordered
(m ≃ 0; players randomly switch between their strategies) and bimodal at
low temperatures, where almost all players are frozen (|m| ≃ 1; each player
always plays the same stategy). In the latter case Ji,j = ±1. Since both the
spins and the distribution of the interactions change during the dynamics,
the disorder is annealed, at variance with the ordinary MG, where disorder
is quenched. The origin of this behavior is in the dynamics in history space:
whereas the MG is (quasi)ergodic, so that the averages in (7) do not change
in time, the players of the LMG in the stationary state see just one single
history, and ergodicity is broken. Moreover they always choose a strategy that
allows them to be in the minority of their local environemnt, which leads to
an effective aniferromagnet. Temperature is not the only parameter affecting
the distribution P (Ji,j): increasing M , a sudden change from a bimodal to a
gaussian distribution takes place (see Fig.1).
Actually, the dependence of the state of the system and of the distribution
of the interactions on T and M is not accidental. The {mi} as well as the
interactions {Ji,j} are free to take values which minimize the Hamiltonian
H [{Ji,j, mi, mj}] of the system, which therefore is identified as an annealed
system with the partition function
Zann =
+∞∫
−∞
∏
i,j∈Λi
dJi,jP [Ji,j]
+1∫
−1
∏
i
dmie
−βH[{Ji,j ,mi,mj}]. (9)
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Before thermalization (i.e. before the dynamics), the distribution P (Ji,j) is
nearly gaussian (implying that all histories are equiprobable),
P (Ji,j) =
1√
2piσJ
e
−
J2
i,j
2σJ . (10)
As a consequence, the hamiltonian of the system can be written as
Hann[{Ji,j, mi, mj}] =
N∑
i=1
∑
j∈Λi
(
J2i,j
2βσ2J
− Ji,j, mi, mj
)
. (11)
After an integration over the disorder the partition function becomes
Zann=
+1∫
−1
∏
i
dmie
β2σ2
J
2
∑
i,j∈Λi
m2
i
m2
j
=
+1∫
−1
∏
i
dmie
−β˜Heff (12)
where β˜ ≡ β2σ2J
2
and Heff = −∑i,j∈Λi m2im2j is the effective hamiltonian, which
no longer depends explicitly on {Ji,j}.
At low temperatures the system tends to < m2i >= 1, while at high temper-
atures < m2i >=
∫ +1
−1
m2
i
2
dmi =
1
3
, because in this case all possible values of
mi occur with uniform probability in [−1,+1]. In between, a critical temper-
ature T˜c is observed, which separates the two cases, and obeys T
2
c ∝ T˜cσ2J .
An approximative calculation of the variance σ2J =< J
2
I,j > depending on M
confirms a phase boundary at Tc ∼ σJ ∼ 2−M . This last result can be ob-
tained assuming that the histories of the neighbors i and j are independent
(which of course is an approximation). Fig.1 shows the distribution P [{Ji,j}]
in the stationary phase for three values of M at a given temperature T = 1.0.
As can be seen, there is a sharp transition from a bimodal distribution for
M = 2 and M = 3 to a nearly gaussian distribution for M = 4. In Fig.2 the
stationary state of the system for M = 3 and T = 1.0 is represented, clearly
showing that the system is ordered (white squares represent frozen players,
black squares unfrozen ones), with a bimodal distribution of the interactions.
For small values of M , all the individuals always use only one of their strate-
gies and win. The histories therefore do not change over time, which clearly
breaks the ergodicity of the dynamics in history space. For M = 4, however,
the system is in the disorderd phase and all the histories occur with roughly
the same probability. This confirms the calculated phase transition at a criti-
cal temperature Tc which is proportional to σJ ∝ 12M . At higher temperature,
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the phase transition from the bimodal to the gaussian distribution takes place
at lower values of M . The phase diagram is displayed in Fig.3.
In the case of small regions, as considered in the above calculations, the influ-
ence of the individual agents on the outcome cannot be neglected; indeed, if
one agent had chosen his unused strategy in the last step, the winning choice
could have easily been the other one. When an agent does not know the ef-
fective impact of both his strategies in the last step, but only the outcome
while using one of them, he overestimates his second, unused strategy con-
siderably [8]. A clearly higher efficiency is thus observed in a population with
complete information, meaning the agents know about the influence that both
their strategies have on the outcome. In such a system nearly all the agents
win at low temperature and only at very high temperature and for large M
does decreasing efficiency occur. Even for T = 1000 and M = 8 the system is
clearly in the ordered phase with 99.9% of all the individuals frozen to one of
their strategies. If the histories are replaced by random sequences of winning
choices, the system with complete information is still more efficient than the
one with partial information, but not as clearly as for real histories. The case
of partial information, however, is the most realistic.
Although the basic principles of the LMG are the same as for the MG, the
behaviors of the two systems have considerable differences in important fea-
tures. Unlike in the MG, where all the individuals interact with each other,
the interactions in the LMG are only local. The system nevertheless shows a
global, collective behavior, because it benefits from the spatial arrangement of
the individuals. The dynamics minimize a hamiltonian that still depends on
the mi, as in the MG. Yet in the LMG also the interactions change during the
dynamics: the disorder is annealed, while in the MG it is quenched. Whereas
the case of two anticorrelated strategies per individual is inefficient in the MG,
in the LMG it is highly efficient and there are cases where all the individuals
can win. On the other hand, random strategies are disadvantageous in the
LMG, because here every individual has his own, subjective information. In a
magnetic system language, random strategies are in general incompatible with
Ji,j = ±1, that is the best interaction in the ordered case, and some resid-
ual disorder will still be present even at low temperatures. Moreover, random
strategies give rise to a non-vanishing random fields hi. In two-dimensionsit is
known that the random-field Ising model is disordered down to T = 0. Hence,
we would need a three dimensional system to recover the phase transition
described above.
Our analysis has therefore shown, analytically and numerically, that despite
their similar structure, the MG and the LMG are significantly different: whereas
in the MG players organize in time, in the LMG space correlations become
important. It is concievable that reality sits in between these two extreme
cases: players could gather information both from their local environments
7
and from some distant sources: a small-world type of connections could be a
good modelization ofsuch a scenario; alternatively, histories could be formed
mixing both the local and the global information, with weigths mimicking the
relevance of each of them to the players. It is appealing to think that both
time and space coordinations could become important in such mixed games.
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Fig. 1. Distribution P [{Ji,j}] at temperature T = 1.0 for the two dimensional LMG
with nearest neighbor interaction and anticorrelated strategies. a) For M = 2, 3 the
system is in the ordered phase, b) while for M = 4 it is in the disordered phase.
Fig. 2. The system for M = 3 and T = 1.: white squares correspond to frozen
players, black squares to players that have not yet frozen.
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Fig. 3. Phase diagram for the LMG with anticorrelated strategies in two dimensions,
where each individual interacts with his four nearest neighbors. The system is in
the ordered phase for low temperatures and low M .
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